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ABSTRACT
When refugees and migrants arrive in Europe, European states portray themselves as
inadvertent hosts to unanticipated crises: well-intentioned, sorely-stretched, and attempting
to negotiate a reasonable solution and find the middle ground between fairly balancing the
needs of refugees and their own citizens. To the contrary, I argue that European states, like
many other developed countries, themselves take part in creating conditions for
displacement in the Third World. This is done through, among other things, international
legal regimes for the global economy, trade, war, and the environmental. Although local
factors also play an important role in Third World displacement, external interventions
have a significant role to play and should be subject to equal scrutiny. For instance, climate
change induced migration is attributable to the largest carbon emitters, and yet this group
of states are unwilling to accept refugees from climate change. I argue that this mismatch
between causation and responsibility is unsustainable and asylum policies aimed at
containing refugees in the Third World through closed European borders, aid, and
proposals for solely local solutions are highly misplaced. As European states continue to
intervene deep into the economic, political and social sphere of Third World countries, they
strip Third World states of their decision-making ability and impose policies in favour of
affluent states, and uphold an international unequal system that lies at the core of
displacement dynamics. Yet these dynamics are not reflected either in international refugee
law or the other legal regimes governing war, economy, trade, or environment. This is
because interventions are enabled through, among other things, international law itself;
under the pretext of rectifying Third World problems. International law helps create a
perception of the international as the saviour and the local as the problem. European and
other developed states are able to obfuscate their roles in displacement and can deny
responsibility for sheltering displaced people. Consequently, a global apartheid persists,
where those who cause displacement maintain their vast privileges through international
law, while most of the displaced that a just law should protect are left to suffer.
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I.

Introduction

While not a new phenomenon, migrants and refugees have over the last year received
vast amounts of media attention because over a million entered Europe and applied for
asylum in this period.1 It is feared by politicians and citizens alike that they are placing a
constraint on welfare systems, labour markets, and allegedly bringing unwanted cultural
norms with them. As a consequence, major efforts are undertaken in order to find a
solution for this change. The recent agreement between Turkey and the EU is an example
of this, ensuring that displaced are contained outside of the continent. The sympathizers
portray this as the only viable and feasible solution, taking into account the needs of those
displaced while also claiming the inculpability of European states caught in such a
challenging situation. But is this the only possible way of perceiving reality? I hold that it
is not.

I argue that European states, like many other developed countries, themselves take part in
creating conditions for displacement in the Third World, while simultaneously refusing to
take responsibility for them. I contend that this is enabled in two main ways: firstly,
through reducing refugee law to a regime that considers only immediate and mostly local
remedies and causes for displaced, and thus disconnecting it from other legal regimes;
and secondly, by institutionalizing suffering through international law while portraying
international law as neutral and fair, where the international is the saviour and the local
the problem.

As international refugee law (IRL) is the only international legal framework that actually
grants the opportunity to enter and stay in another state, IRL will serve as my point of
departure. While refugee law includes an element of responsibility through the principles
of international cooperation, durable solutions, and responsibility (burden)-sharing, I will
examine why such solutions are mostly focused on containing displaced in the Third

1

EUROSTAT, ASYLUM IN THE EU MEMBER STATES: RECORD NUMBER OF OVER 1.2 MILLION FIRST TIME
ASYLUM SEEKERS REGISTERED IN 2015. SYRIANS, AFGHANS AND IRAQIS: TOP CITIZENSHIPS 1 (2016),
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/documents/2995521/7203832/3-04032016-AP-EN.pdf/ (last visited Apr 1,
2016).

World and thus removing from sight external factors that I argue should also be
scrutinized in relation to responsibility. In this regard, I will look at a number of subdisciplines in international law related to international financial institutions, trade,
military intervention, and environmental law in order to discuss how these play an active
part in creating conditions for economic and environmental instability, conflict, and
human rights abuse in the Third World, which are all factors in causing population
movement. Although international law places such causal factors in the background, the
impact of these factors on displacement is well known.

As will be explained in this thesis, the reasons why people are displaced are not clearly
reflected through the ambit of IRL, and other international legal fields that govern some
of the main causes of displacement – such as the global economy, environment, war, or
human rights – these fields do not deal directly with displacement. Given the magnitude
of displacement today, why is international legal discourse disconnected from the main
reasons for mass displacement? What enables actors that have some responsibility for
causing displacement to hide in the background while discussing refugee law and policy,
when providing a remedy for harm done is a general principle of international law?2

In addition to arguing that that there is international responsibility for displacement and
international law helps to hide this, I aim to discuss why and in what way responsibility
should matter. What consequences should making such connections more evident entail?
What would it mean for European asylum and foreign policy? Would it require European
states to widen their quotas for refugees and loosen up border controls? Or perhaps it
shows the need for further reflections about relations of power as reflected in legal
instruments, which are involved in creating displacement and may indeed be crucial to
any potential solution. This would most likely result in an altered vision of the solutions

2

Chorzow Factory Case (Germany v Poland), P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17 (Sept. 13) (1928),
http://www.worldcourts.com/pcij/eng/decisions/1928.09.13_chorzow1.htm (last visited Jan 4, 2016);
Robert McCorquodale, International Organisations and International Human Rights Law: One Giant Leap
for Humankind, in INTERNATIONAL LAW AND POWER: PERSPECTIVES ON LEGAL ORDER AND JUSTICE.
ESSAYS IN HONOUR OF COLINN WARBRICK. 141–164, 146–148 (Kaiyan Homi Kaikobad & Michael
Bohlander eds., 2009).
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that are currently in place, who they serve, and whether they are sustainable in the long
term, for refugees and for European states and societies.

This thesis is divided into seven chapters in addition to the conclusion. Chapter one
explains the main thesis, the methodology as well as outlining the main terminology.
Chapter two gives a general overview of refugees in numbers as well as countries of
origin and destination. Chapter three outlines the main features of IRL as well as
European policies with regards to admission of migrants, asylum seekers and refugees. It
explains how IRL restricts protection to only a small group of displaced, while European
states have created a wide range of measures intended to keep asylum seekers from
reaching European territory or to ensure their prompt return. This allows European, and
other, states to avoid dealing with them.

Chapter four examines economic interventions by international financial institutions, and
explores how these institutions, together with the powerful states controlling them, play a
role in entrenching poverty and creating conditions for instability in the Third World, an
important factor in migration. Chapter five deals with international trade, particularly the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its TRIPS agreement. It argues that the current
global trade regime upholds existing inequalities and further entrenches poverty in the
Third World, while benefiting multinational companies and many people in more affluent
states. The chapter explores the consequences of this for displacement and migration
patterns. Chapter six looks at how military interventions create displacement, through
actual military action as well as post-conflict statebuilding by international actors that
transform the state from within.

The final chapter looks at environmental reasons for displacement such as climate change
and other types of environmental degradation, and discusses how the few states carrying
the largest responsibility for such problems are nevertheless not taking responsibility for
adequately assisting those displaced as a consequence. My main thesis through all
chapters is to show how the corresponding international law regimes in each of these

3

fields help those that contribute greatly to displacement globally to cloud, obfuscate, or
deny their responsibility.

A.

Methodology

To demonstrate that displacement has international causes, rather than primarily local
ones, I rely on scholars that fall broadly within critical approaches to international law.
This is because I hold that international law holds a bias towards the interests of the states
that are politically and economically the most affluent, the developed states, and as such
the mainstream international legal narrative tends to be shaped by such a standpoint. As
such, in order to understand how the affluent states themselves through law are
perpetuating suffering in the Third World, and consequently displacement, there is a need
to deconstruct and suggest an alternative view to the mainstream narrative that argues
that affluent states offer the solution rather than being part of the problem.

Therefore, I intend to rely on scholars broadly within the category of critical approaches
that focus on issues of responsibility, such as Anne Orford; as well as BS Chimni, a
renowned scholar of Third World Approaches to International Law (TWAIL) as well as
Marxist approaches, that has worked on refugee law. Anthony Anghie is also a TWAIL
scholar who is useful in order to understand the way powerful states and institutions have
formed international law. Other critical theorists outside of the field of law, such as
Thomas Pogge and David Chandler also serve as helpful complements.

While I do not intend to idealize the local sphere and hold that the international sphere is
solely responsible for displacement and suffering in the Third World, I do argue that the
latter must be subject to greater scrutiny in order to understand appropriately the
dynamics of displacement. Most guidelines and policies related to IRL suggest only local
remedies and solutions to local problems, rarely questioning how this focus on the local
and away from the international is enabled through international law. The number of
displaced people is growing, pointing to a serious mismatch between current international
law solutions for displacement and the causes of displacement. External factors are
4

hidden from view, particularly due to the way international law is structured, serving the
interests of the powerful. Critical legal scholarship calls for a more nuanced approach to
international law, which takes into consideration power relations between the actors
international law is made by and for. As the purpose of this thesis is to examine
international responsibility for displacement and the role of international law in shaping
such responsibility, scholars taking a critical approach to international law provide
helpful methods and insights into the relevant power dynamics and how these dynamics
relate to international law.

B.

Terminology

There is a range of terms used while discussing people who move, often depending on a
degree of voluntariness and the motivation behind the decision to migrate. A refugee is,
according to widespread usage in the media and by the layperson, someone who has fled
his or her home due to a variety of reasons such as conflict, war, persecution, human
rights violations, poverty, famine, or environmental degradation.

In contrast to the widespread usage, the legal criteria for defining a refugee depart from
the common usage of the term in a number of ways, where the 1951 Convention Related
to the Status of Refugees (hereinafter the 1951 Refugee Convention) and its 1967
Protocol protects only those fleeing from specific types of civil and political rights
violations that relate to discrimination, and excludes reasons related to socio-economic
rights.3 In addition, it only includes people having crossed an international border.4 This
reduces the number of refugees legally defined as such by the 1951 Refugee Convention

3

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees art. 1 A(2), entered into force April 22, 1954, 189 U.N.T.S.
150. Article 1 A(2) stipulates that the term refugee applies to anyone who “As a result of events occurring
before 1 January 1951 and owing to wellfounded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion,
nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that
country; or who, not having a nationality and being outside the country of his former habitual residence as a
result of such events, is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it”.
4
B.S. Chimni, Who is a refugee?, in INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE LAW. A READER., 4 (B.S. Chimni ed., 8 ed.
2012).

5

to only a very small proportion of those forcibly displaced as encompassed by the term’s
ordinary usage.

Asylum seekers are people seeking to be granted refugee status according to international
and national legal instruments. Internally displaced people are usually defined as people
forced to leave their habitual residence due to factors such as violence and armed
conflicts, but remaining within their state of origin.5 The more general term forced
migration focuses mainly on an element of coercion, and often includes people fleeing
persecution, conflict, general violence, violations of human rights, famine, drought, as
well as environmental change and natural disasters. It refers to both those crossing
international borders as well as people remaining in their state of origin.6

On the other hand, people who migrate for reasons not mentioned above are commonly
considered to move voluntarily, and are usually referred to as economic migrants or
migrant workers.7 This latter group is commonly understood as a separate group less
deserving of protection and without the right to remain in another country. In actual fact,
under international law, only those who fall under the narrow legal definition of refugee
have the right to remain in another country.
All other categories of migrants – whether forced or voluntary – can only remain at the
discretion of the host state. Regional legal regimes in Africa and Central America have
attempted to ameliorate this problem by extending regional law to encompass other types
of forced migration such as mass violations of human rights, war, and natural disasters.
However, these regimes have limited geographical applicability.

5

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION LAW: GLOSSARY ON
MIGRATION 8, 32–33 (2004).
6
UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES (UNHCR), MID-YEAR TRENDS 3 (2015),
http://www.unhcr.org/56701b969.html (last visited Feb 26, 2016); What is forced migration?, FORCED
MIGRATION ONLINE, http://www.forcedmigration.org/about/whatisfm (last visited Feb 26, 2016);
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), supra note 5 at 25; Asylum and Migration,
UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/4a1d406060.html (last visited Apr 1, 2016).
7
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION (IOM), supra note 5 at 20, 41.
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In this thesis, I attempt to problematize the common categorizations of migrants, and
especially the notion of voluntariness. In addition, I hold that the proliferation of
categories enables the creation of a hierarchy deciding who is the most deserving of
protection and assistance and as such permits a disavowal of responsibility. States that are
involved in displacing people, as will be argued in this thesis, have a wide discretion of
who can enter and stay within their borders. In that way, such categories become part of
the problem rather than the solution.

Many factors are involved in the decision to migrate, and it is difficult to draw the line
between what is voluntary and not. As an example, it is questionable whether people
migrating due to economic needs have a real choice of staying behind. As such, I hold
that most movements include a coercive element. As the purpose of the present thesis is
to highlight injustices perpetrated by states of the Global North which leads to people
moving, I use the term refugee in its broader popular meaning of someone who is forced
to move, rather than its strict legal meaning. I use the terms displaced and displacement
to encompass both refugees as well as migrants. As the aforementioned categories are
well-established, and are part and parcel of the legal regimes I critique, it will be
impossible not to refer to them, especially when referring to data, numbers, research, and
specific policies. This illustrates how internalized and entrenched such categories are in
existing analyses about population movement.

7

II.

Displacement: A Global Concern

Displaced people are mostly fleeing persecution, conflict, general violence, violations of
human rights, famine, drought, as well as other types of environmental change and
natural disasters, which thus form the main causes of displacement around the world.8
According to Forced Migration Online, displacement has increasingly become a strategic
tactic often used by all sides in the conflict and as such there has been a large increase in
the number of refugees.9 In addition, the deterioration of the situation in countries where
refugees were residing is contributing to force more people to move onwards,10 including
economic reasons.

Displacement is and has been one of the largest humanitarian issues over the last century,
with over 55 million people currently of concern to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) and the number continuously increasing.
Although the IRL principle of responsibility (burden)-sharing advocates for solidarity
between states, countries in the Third World are carrying most of the responsibility for
hosting refugees. Northern states prefer to participate in (mostly inadequate) funding to
UNHCR, refugee-hosting states, and countries of origin.

A number of measures to deal with displacement have been implemented on both
regional and global levels. This involves measures offering protection to refugees, such
as asylum and resettlement; as well as measures for countries to mitigate the effects on
their own local societies, including the use of a restrictive definition of the term refugee
as well as other justifications for why refugees ought to or must turn elsewhere. Aid and
cooperation with refugee-hosting states has in this regard received a prominent role.11
This thesis questions whether such measures can realistically create durable solutions for
displacement. As will be highlighted, this is because the current solutions are developed

8

UNHCR, supra note 6 at 3; What is forced migration?, supra note 6; Asylum and Migration, supra note 6.
What is forced migration?, supra note 6.
10
UNHCR, SO CLOSE: YET SO FAR FROM SAFETY (2014), http://www.unhcr.org/54ad53b69.pdf (last visited
Apr 1, 2016).
11
See chapter three subsection C.
9

in a context where refugee law and scholarship rarely tackles the root causes of
displacement, and when it does, avoids considering other factors than those pertaining to
the internal issues in countries of displacement themselves.

While displacement has been an issue for decades, the number of displaced people is on
the rise. According to the UNHCR, as of January 2015, almost 55 million persons were
of concern to the organization. Of these, over 14 million were considered refugees,
almost 1.8 million were asylum-seekers, and 32 million IDPs, with the remaining falling
into other displacement categories.12 UNHCR estimates that the actual number has
surpassed 60 million.13 According to population data from this period, this amounts to
around 0.8 percent of the world’s population.14
While considering only refugees, UNHCR claims that “[t]he total number of refugees has
increased significantly and consistently over the past four years,” from 10.4 million at the
end of 2011 to reaching 15.1 million by mid-2015, the highest in 20 years. The main
reason behind the recent surge is the war in Syria, however conflicts in other countries
like Afghanistan, Burundi, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Mali, Somalia, South
Sudan, and Ukraine have contributed considerably as well.15 In addition, the number of
people being able to return to their country of origin is going down, and as such many
refugees and displaced will reside outside of their country of origin for many years.
UNHCR shows that sub-Saharan Africa hosts the largest number of refugees (4.1
million), while Asia, Europe and the MENA region host 3.8, 3.5 and 3 million
respectively.16

12

UNHCR, UNHCR GLOBAL APPEAL 2016-2017 (2015), http://www.unhcr.org/564da0e3b.html (last
visited Jan 4, 2016).
13
UNHCR, supra note 6 at 4–6.
14
Population of the entire world, yearly, 1950-2100, GEOHIVE,
http://www.geohive.com/earth/his_history3.aspx (last visited Apr 1, 2016).
15
UNHCR, supra note 6 at 4–6. Regarding country of origin, Syria is currently the largest source country
of refugees. It was followed by Afghanistan (around 2.6 million), Somalia (1.1. million). Other refugee
producing countries are South Sudan, Sudan, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, the Central African
Republic, Myanmar, Eritrea and Iraq, in this order.
16
Id. at 3.
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Another salient feature mentioned by UNHCR is that half of the top 10 refugee-hosting
countries are sub-Saharan African.17 Except for Turkey, which is the country hosting the
largest number of refugees in 2015 (due to the Syrian conflict), the other 10 countries on
the list are developing countries.18 Although recent numbers have been increasing,
displacement is not a new phenomenon, and numbers have been high for decades.19

In terms of asylum-seekers, almost a million individual asylum applications were
registered worldwide in the first half of 2015, which was almost double the number in
mid-2014.20 In general, the yearly number is around a million.21 In addition to this,
UNHCR reports that an estimated 34 million IDPs were currently assisted by UNHCR by
mid-2015, the greatest numbers being within Syria, Colombia, Iraq, Sudan, Pakistan,
South Sudan, DRC, Nigeria and Ukraine.22

Compared to the numbers of refugees and asylum seekers world-wide, Europe is hosting
a much lower number. According to Eurostat, there were just below 300,000 asylumseekers lodging their applications in the EU in 2004, just below 200,000 in 2006, back to
300,000 again in 2011, after which it started rising considerably, and reached over
600,000 in 2014.23 The 2014 number was the highest number of asylum applicants in the

17

Id. at 6.
Id. at 6–7. By mid-year 2015, the list includes Pakistan (1.5 million), Lebanon (1.2 million), Iran
(982,000), Ethiopia (702,500), Jordan (664,100), Kenya (552,300), Uganda (428,400), Chad (420,800) and
Sudan (356,200). These numbers are of refugees under UNHCR mandate and as such is underestimated.
19
UNHCR, POPULATIONS OF CONCERN TO UNHCR: A STATISTICAL OVERVIEW 1–71 13 (1994),
http://www.unhcr.org/3bfa33154.html The report states that over 27 million persons were of concern to
UNHCR in 1994; Population of the entire world, yearly, 1950-2100, supra note 14 According to population
numbers at this website, the 1994 number of refugees amounted to around 0.48 percent of the world’s
population.
20
UNHCR, supra note 6 at 9.
21
Asylum-Seekers, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c137.html (last visited Apr 1, 2016).
22
UNHCR, supra note 6 at 14.
23
Eurostat, FILE:ASYLUM APPLICATIONS (NON-EU) IN THE EU-28 MEMBER STATES, 2004–14,
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/index.php/File:Asylum_applications_(non-EU)_in_the_EU28_Member_States,_2004%E2%80%9314_(%C2%B9)_(thousands)_YB15_III.png (last visited Feb 27,
2016).
18
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EU since the peak in 1992.24 As a comparison, only 27% of the first instance decisions
were positive in the EU 2008, 25% in 2011, although 45% in 2014.25

Refugees and asylum-seekers are increasingly finding their way across the
Mediterranean, as other routes are closed to them. Many lose their lives on their way. The
main migration routes across the Mediterranean to Europe are from North Africa and
Turkey. The principal North African points of departure are Tunisia and Libya, directed
towards Italian islands and Malta. People passing over Turkish territory attempt to reach
Greece by boat, and previously through the land border. Others attempt to cross the
border to Bulgaria.26 In 2014, 165,000 refugees and migrants arrived in Europe through
these routes, compared to 60,000 in 2013. Although the people crossing the
Mediterranean in 2014 came from over 40 different countries, almost half of them were
from Syria and Eritrea. According to UNHCR, forced displacement was at the centre of
sea arrivals, with a large number “fleeing from war, violence and persecution.”27

24

Asylum statistics - Statistics Explained, EUROSTAT, http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statisticsexplained/index.php/Asylum_statistics (last visited Feb 27, 2016).
25
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, ASYLUM IN THE EU: FACTS AND FIGURES (2015),
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/RegData/etudes/BRIE/2015/551332/EPRS_BRI%282015%29551332_EN.p
df (last visited Feb 27, 2016).
26
FRONTEX, FRAN QUARTERLY 9 (2015),
http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/FRAN_Q1_2015.pdf (last visited Apr 1, 2016);
EUROMED, EUROMED MIGRATION III PROJECT: THE MANAGEMENT OF MIXED MIGRATION FLOWS IN
THE LAST DECADE: LESSONS LEARNT AND OPTIONS FOR THE FUTURE 15 5–9 (2007),
http://www.unhcrwashington.org/sites/default/files/UAC_4_Refugee%20Protection%20and%20Mixed%20
Migration%2010%20Point%20Plan_February%202011_English.pdf (last visited Apr 1, 2016).
27
UNHCR, supra note 10.
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III.

International Refugee Law: Burden Shifting and Apartheid

International refugee law (IRL) is the main international legal framework that can
provide admission and stay for aliens in another country. All European states are parties
to the 1951 Refugee Convention and thus rely on IRL when developing their own
national and regional policies with regards to asylum and admission. In this chapter I
argue that that IRL is only protecting a small group of displaced people. This is firstly
due to its restrictive legal definition of the term refugee. Secondly, it has evolved into a
regime that favours the containment of displaced within the Third World. Thirdly,
European states are implementing a vast number of measures ensuring that most
displaced people never enter European jurisdiction and thus will not have the opportunity
to claim asylum. Thus, European states can claim that they are upholding principles of
human rights and IRL while in actual fact granting asylum only to a minimal number of
needy people.

In this chapter I will start with outlining the main features of IRL and how the protection
regime favours containment of displaced in the Third World. This will be illustrated by
examining European asylum policies, which I hold are excluding, rather than protecting,
the displaced. Finally, I discuss the legal principles of burden-sharing and cooperation
between states and conclude that currently Third World states and people are carrying the
largest part of the burden.

A.

Legal Overview of Refugee Definition and Granting of Asylum

Among the most crucial part of IRL is the definition of the term refugee, which is of
utmost importance in order to understand what refugee law can and cannot legally
provide for people who have been forced to leave their homes. This definition can be
found in refugee law’s main legal instruments: the 1951 Convention Relating to the
Status of Refugees28 and its 1967 Protocol.29 The Convention provides the most widely

28
29

Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, Supra note 3.
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force October 4, 1967.

accepted legal definition of a refugee, and incorporates the important concept of nonrefoulement, in addition to providing minimum standards of treatment of refugees.30

The legal criteria for defining a refugee depart from the common usage of the term in a
number of ways. According to widespread usage in the media and by the layperson, a
refugee is someone who has fled his or her home due to a variety of reasons like conflict,
war, persecution, human rights violations, poverty, famine or environmental degradation.
In contrast to this, the legal definition as per the 1951 Refugee Convention stipulates that
a refugee is someone who “owing to well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of
race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is
outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to
avail himself of the protection of that country.”31 As such, the 1951 Refugee Convention
protects only those fleeing from specific types of civil and political rights violations that
occur in the context of discrimination, and excludes reasons related to socio-economic
rights as well as civil and political rights’ violations unrelated to a discrimination
context.32

The 1951 Refugee Convention is only concerned with refugees from Europe fleeing
events occurring before 1951. The 1967 Additional Protocol removes this geographic and
temporal limitation, however the term refugee has not been reconsidered, which has led
to most Third World refugees being excluded, as they frequently flee due to conflict,
natural disasters, as well as political and economic turmoil, rather than being fleeing
discrimination-based persecution as understood in the European experience of the

30
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holocaust during the Second World War, which was an experience that profoundly
shaped the writing of the 1951 Refugee Convention.33

Although the Convention was intended as a response to victims of war, it grants refugee
status only to those who have a well-founded fear of persecution for “reasons of race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion,”34
which means that they must be “subject to differential victimization.”35 As such, most
people in the world leaving their homes due to human rights violations or general
violence do not qualify as refugees in the legal sense.36 As mentioned in the introduction,
the purpose of the present thesis is to highlight injustices perpetrated by states of the
Global North that contribute to displacement. Thus, I will consider refugees in the
general sense of the word, as the exclusionary nature of the legal definition plays a part in
hampering the possibilities to examine the causes of displacement.

Although the 1951 Refugee Convention has such a narrow definition, article 33 of the
1951 Refugee Convention states that “no Contracting State shall expel or return
(‘refouler’) a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race, religion, nationality,
membership of a particular social group or political opinion.”37 Consequently, although
states can hold that an asylum seeker does not fit the definition of a refugee based on the
criterion of being particularly targeted, the non-refoulement principle is of a wider
application. As such, a person not defined as a refugee shall in the mentioned
circumstances still not be sent back, although they need not be granted refugee status or
the benefits provided for refugees under the Convention. Often in these situations states
will grant the person protected by non-refoulement some other type of humanitarian
status or send them to a third state.

33

Id. at 7–8.
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B.

Non-Entré Policies towards Refugees from the Third World

The refugee regime has undergone changes since the 1951 Refugee Convention was
adopted, due to changing political circumstances and the appearance of a new type of
asylum seekers. For example, the narrow refugee definition relates to the historical and
political context. The convention was drafted with the backdrop of the Cold War, where
political dissenters from Soviet states and its allies served as a political purpose for the
western states, and were thus offered asylum.38 However, especially after the Cold War,
refugees no longer had an ideological value and a majority were arriving from Third
World states, which added to the growing idea that people were economic migrants
aiming for better opportunities rather than refugees.

It was also held that Third World refugees were displaced due to internal rather than
international conflicts, for which the post-colonial state was solely responsible. Finally,
some argued that the number of the new asylum seekers were too large, and as such it
was expected that states closer to the origin of displacement would host them while being
granted financial assistance from western states.39 Thus the refugee law regime evolved
into a non-entrée regime that excludes most displaced people.40

Due to the resulting policies we can observe that, in 1991, Sudan alone was hosting more
refugees than Western Europe and North America together.41 In terms of more recent
accounts, the number of refugees in the US, Canada as well as Western, Central, and
Southern Europe in 2015, was according to the UNHCR just below two million, while in
Sudan and South Sudan alone this number was 4.8 million.42 In terms of asylum, the
38
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number of refugees of concern to UNHCR in mid-2014 reached 13 million,43 while
around 600,000 applied for asylum in Europe in 2014,44 and only around 71,000 were
resettled the year before,45 thus leaving most refugees in less than adequate situations in
the Third World.

To cope with the large numbers of displaced persons that do not fall under the
Convention, UNHCR is continuously expanding its mandate, and is increasingly turning
into a humanitarian organization, focusing on preventive protection, internally displaced
persons, returnees and humanitarian relief activities.46 This has to do with the fact that
UNHCR is reliant on the financial support of its donors (powerful Western states), and is
obliged to serve these interests. Thus, UNHCR has had a prominent role in enabling the
shift in refugee law in the post-Cold War era, promoting concepts of protection in the
Third World, safety zones, and temporary protection.47

Another reason for the prominence of local solutions in the Third World, has to do with
the fact that states of the Global North have exercised high influence over the knowledge
production about displacement and asylum. This has been led by academic institutions in
the Global North, which have manly focused on local explanations for displacement,
while ignoring external causes like trade and economic policies. According to this view,
conflicts occur due to cultural, economic and political factors internal to these countries.
Thus, it may seem natural that displacement is considered to be best mitigated by firstly,
protecting those fleeing their homes, and secondly, providing assistance to countries of
transit and origin. As such, addressing other issues like global inequality has been left to
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http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49e45bb01.html (last visited Apr 16, 2016).
43
UNHCR - Figures at a Glance, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c11.html (last visited Nov
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scholars outside of IRL to deal with, as the two realms’ interconnectedness is
obfuscated.48

As the Refugee Convention is applied by member states, international oversight is
minimal, and as such in practice states have a lot of leeway in interpreting how the
Convention is applied.49 This, coupled with the vast exclusionary measures ensuring that
displaced people rarely arrive in any Western state, ensures that Western states are
allowed “to maintain the façade of universal, humane concern without the necessity of
affording genuine protection.”50 The failure to acknowledge such contradictions makes it
possible to avoid discussing responsibility and adequate solutions.51 The following
section will illustrate the previously mentioned points through examining the main
elements of European asylum policies.

C.

European Policies on Admission of Refugees and Asylum Seekers

European states have created a wide range of measures intended to keep asylum seekers
from reaching European territory or to ensure that they promptly return, which is the
main reason behind EU migration policies.52 By keeping most displaced people away
from European jurisdictions, they are able to avoid examining asylum claims, evade the
need to deport unsuccessful asylum seekers, and escape non-refoulement obligations.
This includes enhanced sea-patrolling and border control, restricting visa procedures,
requiring airlines to check visas before boarding,53 as well as bilateral agreement with
countries bordering Europe. Other measures to ensure refugees do not reach Europe

48
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include aid to UNHCR, to non-European countries hosting refugees, as well as to
countries where displacement occurs. As such, only a small percentage of refugees reach
Europe, while most are hosted in less than adequate conditions in the Third World,
placing a large burden on already poor states. Despite all this, the international legal
system allows Europe to claim that it is committed to protecting refugees.54
1.

A Security Language

The exclusionary policies by Northern states are partly enabled through framing the
refugee issue in a security language, where refugees pose a security threat to the host
states and societies55 rather than a victim in need for protection. As a consequence,
Baldwin-Edwards argues that recently the EU has placed a remarkable emphasis on
security aspects of migration, like for example controlling borders, detaining and
expelling illegal migrants.56

In light of an enhanced focus on security at the expense of human rights, a number of
agreements have been entered with neighbouring states, among them the European
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), Mobility Partnerships, as well as other bilateral
agreements between EU member states and non-EU states. Through such agreements, the
EU is partially leaving the management of its borders and asylum processing to partner
states.57 These partnerships ensure a joint border management system outside of the EU
which includes immigration and asylum policy as an important feature,58 among them
visa policies, enhanced sea and land border patrolling, exchange of information and
training of officials involved in border management,59 with the aim to prevent
undocumented migrants from reaching Europe. It has been held that these methods often
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result in asylum-seekers and refugees being denied international protection.60 Frontex,61
the European agency which manages the border control was established in 2004 and has
carried out various maritime joint operations in the Mediterranean, particularly due to
pressure from southern European states.62

Readmission agreements form an important feature in the EU migration policies, often
made possible through negotiating other issues such as economic assistance or
development aid.63 These ensure that that states parties to such agreements agree to
accept back their nationals and often third country nationals who passed through the
territory of this country before reaching Europe.64 This allows the EU member state to
expel third country nationals that cannot be sent back to their country of origin due to the
principle of non-refoulement. As the signatory state is often considered a so-called ‘safe
third state’, it is assumed that sending people to this country enables the EU member state
to observe the non-refoulement principle. But the often inadequate asylum and human
rights standards of the readmitting country has led to many questioning whether these
third states are really safe.65 It has also been shown that states often return people without
giving them the opportunity to claim asylum, raising concerns about indirect refoulement
if the third state may not provide a durable solution either.66

In addition to these policies, the EU has realized that restricting access may not prove
good results, and as such there have been proposals to invest in “job creation, economic
growth and poverty alleviation schemes in Africa in order to stem the tide of irregular
emigration and/or stimulate development”.67
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2.

Asylum

Based on the 1951 Refugee Convention, the EU states have established a Common
European Asylum System, which is aimed at harmonizing common minimum legal
standards in all member states, in addition to ensuring practical cooperation and solidarity
among the states.68 According to the European Union, its asylum system aims to form a
“joint approach to guarantee high standards of protection for refugees.”69 However, in
light of the previous paragraphs about border patrols, readmission agreements and visa
restrictions, it becomes clear that this only counts for a small group of refugees and
asylum-seekers and not all those actually attempting to reach the continent.

3.

Resettlement

Since most refugees are unable to return to their country of origin, another durable
solution to their situation is resettlement in a third country, an option provided to a small
number of recognized refugees. The idea behind this solution is that an expanded option
for organized resettlement would reduce the need for refugees to irregularly undertake
secondary movements.70 Although resettlement is provided as a durable solution in the
UNHCR statute, less than one percent of the 15 million refugees UNHCR knows of are
submitted for resettlement. Only a small number of states are taking part in the
resettlement programme on a voluntary basis,71 around 25 developed countries.72 In 2011,
the EU resettled a bit over 4,000 refugees which amounted to only 7 percent of the total
resettled,73 and much less when considering the word’s refugee population.
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D.

Burden-Sharing

The change in the refugee protection regime as well as the range of measures taken by
states of the Global North with the aim of impeding displaced from arriving renders
protection under IRL meaningless, as this system enables states of the Global North to
physically deny people in need of protection a genuine right to seek asylum while
simultaneously claiming it respects international obligations. This contradicts the concept
of burden-sharing, a central feature of IRL aimed at ensuring solidarity among states with
regards to the burden of hosting displaced people.

The concept is closely related to international cooperation and solidarity, and has been
widely discussed by a number of scholars in addition to forming a continuous debate
among states on how to address and resolve refugee situations, especially considering the
uneven burden that is placed upon countries. The international refugee regime is
dependent on cooperation between states, as displacement challenges are transnational
and cannot be addressed by individual states alone.74 The burden-sharing principle
mentioned in the preamble of the 1951 Refugee Convention,75 and Chimni argues that it
is part of customary international law and thus legally binding.76

Burden-sharing can take various forms, among them the provision of material, technical
or financial assistance, in addition to resettlement of asylum-seekers and refugees. It may
also include other provisions of durable solutions like temporary protection, local
integration and voluntary repatriation.77 It can also mean sending troops to assist in
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stabilizing countries in conflict, humanitarian assistance as well as funds for
statebuilding.78

There are, however, no agreed parameters for how burden-sharing could be carried out in
practice.79 Experts have placed emphasis on the fact that burden-sharing does not equal
evading international obligations under international law, but should be complementary
to states’ protection responsibilities. Therefore aid to states hosting refugees or for
humanitarian purposes does not justify closure of borders.80 With a view to the outlines of
European policies above, it is clear that European states are disregarding the fact that
burden-sharing should only be a complement to existing international obligations. By
closing borders with the justification that it provides external assistance, international
obligations are evaded.81

Given the unequal burden many refugee-hosting states are carrying, the issue of burdensharing has been heavily debated among refugee scholars, with solutions ranging from
accepting the existing inequalities and respecting all interests, to suggestions of a
complete change in the international refugee regime taking into account responsibilities
for entrenchment of global structural inequalities.

As an example of the first view, Hathaway and Neve realize the lack of will by states to
host refugees, and attempt to take this into account and look for a pragmatic solution
based on state interest. They propose a system of international burden-sharing where each
state contributes according to its relative capacity, and participates in a system similar to
that of an insurance scheme. This will allow the states to distribute the various financial
and physical responsibilities to protect refugees among themselves, as long as the
refugee’s risk to protection is not at stake.
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However, Hathaway’s solution can also create negative effects. Chimni criticizes this
view and claims that Hathaway proposes “a solution which is far worse than the one he
has critiqued.” He claims that Hathaway turns the refugee into a commodity to be traded
among states, where already affluent states can take the structural inequalities among
states to their advantage to pay themselves out of the refugee problem, thus creating a
global apartheid. He, in turn, suggests that the refugee question not only originates from
problems within the state where people are displaced, but also due to an unjust
international system. Therefore, he advocates for a new approach that addresses global
justice through the principles of solidarity, where the contribution of transnational
capitalism, imperialism and those promoting it, and thus responsibility for displacement,
are not ignored.82
Although Hathaway might offer a pragmatic and potentially feasible solution given the
unequal relationships of power between states on the international level, I argue in this
thesis that a genuine solution to both the suffering by displaced people, in addition to the
pressure on host states, must take into account the unjust international system. This is
because root causes of displacement go deeper than its immediate, local causes like
human rights abuse and conflict; the main issue is related to the continuous unjust global
order upheld by a powerful group of states and institutions, which again relates to other
international legal regimes. Without considering such a view, it may seem reasonable that
other states have no obligation to take in those needing protection, and repatriation has
become seen as the only solution to the problem.83 Therefore, taking into consideration
both internal and external factors for displacement is key to understand appropriately its
dynamics, and thus Chimni’s view is worthy of exploration.
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E.

Conclusion

The international community (i.e. affluent states) is still left to find a durable solution for
the over 55 million refugees on a global level. With most of the world’s refugees out of
sight, those with the most influence in IRL, scholarship and knowledge production can
deal with the situation according to their own interests, while communities in the Third
World take the heaviest toll, especially through severe measures in put place by the
Global North ensuring that asylum-seekers never arrive in the North. The Global North,
European states included, benefits from what scholars have called ‘global apartheid’,
where Northern citizens can enjoy incredible benefits while a large majority of the
world’s population is living in less than adequate conditions and with no legal recourse to
even physically enter rich territories such as the European enclave.

Although regions like for example the EU have started to realize that closing borders is
not sufficient to stop refugee flows, most measures to mitigate this phenomenon are
geared towards creating incentives for either countries of origin or transit to contain
refugees there. This does not ensure an end to suffering, but keeps displaced out of sight
in Europe, and as such, European states still do not admit any role in external causes of
displacement. This has to do with the fact that refugee law and scholarship is
disconnected from other legal regimes, and is as such unable to consider the root causes
of displacement in a wider perspective of structural global inequalities and injustice. In
this context, it seems difficult for the refugee field to find other, more durable solutions
than those serving as a band-aid to people who have already become victims of
displacement in addition to shifting the problem to other, less fortunate states to deal
with.

With this in mind, the aim of this thesis is to rectify this problem where I outline the way
European states are implicated in creating conditions for displacement and what this
means for European policies and the elaboration of genuine solutions to this issue. In
order to do this, global inequality and international causes of displacement must be taken
into account. As such, the following chapters will examine the main features of
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international law and the main state actors that participate in institutionalizing suffering
in the Third World, and thus carrying responsibility for displacement.
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IV.
International Economic Law and Institutions: Intervention, Instability, and
Displacement
Since the end of the Cold War, international financial institutions (IFIs) have played an
enhanced role in furthering neo-liberal economic policies as exemplified in the
Washington Consensus, including promoting increased free trade, deregulation of the
economy, and privatization.84 In this chapter I argue that economic policy is a part of
global governance that has a tremendous effect on Third World countries, and plays an
important role in entrenching poverty and creating conditions of instability. International
institutions and the states influencing them portray these policies as technical solutions
for people’s own benefit. Through playing on unequal power structures, institutions
embed a narrative of local causes of conflict and displacement and remove any trace of
external responsibility. As the primary motivator for international migration today is
economic betterment, consequences like poverty and general instability are crucial in
order to understand contemporary human mobility.

This chapter will first outline the main laws and policies related to economic
restructuring. Then, I will explain the rationale behind such policies and their
consequences on Third World displacement dynamics. I will examine how international
law has enabled these destabilizing endeavours through a narrative of good governance
and human rights that localizes responsibilities and causes and hampers the ability to
connect international economic laws and policies with displacement.

A.

Legal Overview of Structural Adjustment Programmes by IFIs

International financial institutions (IFIs), like the World Bank (WB) and the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) have wide impact in the global economy and governance, and are
as such managing Third World states and their people. This is particularly as half of the
world’s population is bound by their policies.85
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The WB and the IMF were created in 1944 at the Bretton Woods Conference, which had
its purpose of coordinating and managing international monetary and financial matters.
While the WB places emphasis on promoting development and foreign investment, the
IMF has a focus on monetary policy. Both provide loans to the Third World, which are
subject to certain conditionalities which in turn, according to Anghie, “play an extremely
important role in the formulation of Third World economic policies.”86 This is because
the conditionalities require the receiving state to “to embark upon the radical
restructuring of their economies through ‘structural adjustment programmes’,”87 in order
to make use of the resources provided. Such reforms are often carried out with the
support of liberals in the target state.88

While restructuring programmes are designed for increased efficiency, expanding
growth, and resilience to economic shocks, it is expected of the target countries that they
alter their legal framework with regards to foreign investment and export-targeted
production, government spending and privatization, liberalization of the economy, and
devaluation. As such, requirements for change in legislation touch upon elements like the
state budget, education and health policies, cutbacks in subsidies, social security and
wage levels. Restructuring may also involve constitutional reform, including
centralization policies.89

B.

Reasons for Conditionalities

The WB and the IMF intervene through an invitation from the state involved, usually in
order for this Third World state to take up a loan in order to overcome financial problems
and to boost the economy. According to the IMF, its assistance “enables countries to
rebuild their international reserves, stabilize their currencies, continue paying for imports,
and restore conditions for strong economic growth, while undertaking policies to correct
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underlying problems.”90 Particularly with regards to fragile states, it claims to be involved
in order to assist in improved economic management and performance, as the factors
behind state fragility are related to the lack of inclusiveness, underdevelopment, weak
governance and institutions as well as conflict and instability.91 Similarly, it claims that
conditionality is a tool which can help countries to solve payment issues without harming
national or international prosperity, in addition to ensuring the ability of the state to repay
the loan. Furthermore, it maintains that it assists countries to “protect the most vulnerable
in a crisis.”92

In this chapter, as will be explained below, I argue that this narrative is in contradiction
with the fact that this alleged assistance has resulted in destabilizing these countries to the
benefit of the states controlling them, where reforms like privatization and stripping the
state of its main function is usually what affects the most vulnerable the hardest.

C.

Results of Conditionalities

Although it is held that such conditionalities lead to the improvement of the receiving
state’s economy, these elements are not entirely uncontroversial. A number of scholars
also hold that they limit people’s self-determination, and through intervening excessively
in the host state, these conditionalities have actually shown to lead to collapse in state
institutions, entrenchment of poverty, which sometimes results in conflict and human
rights abuses. In general, the people in the states affected are less able to influence their
governments in a democratic way, as many decisions are made by international
technocrats.
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The aim in this thesis is not to argue that all IMF and WB activities are negative for the
host state, as such an argument would ignore valuable technical and financial
contributions provided. However, this thesis is mainly highlighting negative effects of
international interventions that are otherwise usually out of view, and likewise their link
to refugees and displacement. Thus, the following paragraphs will place emphasis on
negative and less discussed links to these institutions and global inequality, which is
crucial to understand displacement dynamics.

1.

Lack of Self-Determination

Various critics, among them Orford and Anghie, hold that the extensive intervention by
international financial institutions constrains these countries from formulating their own
policies according to their own needs and interests. This limits the power of the people to
influence their governments, which is rather exercised through IMF and WB officials.
Thus, policies in many areas like health, labour, social security and education, as
mentioned above, are dictated by international economists, rather than by local
politicians, something that was once considered to be central to democratic governance.
Consequently the right to self-determination and democratic governance is infringed
upon, and these states do not have control over their own economy.93 Anne Orford argues
that this contradicts the fact that the WB and IMF are committed to further
democratization,94 as functions “go to the heart of political and constitutional authority.”95
The inability for states to appropriately develop their own policies in crucial areas, makes
the states vulnerable to influence by external institutions, states and corporations, driving
policy changes in their favour at the expense of local needs. This could, as will be
explained below, lead to social unrest and thus displacement.
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2.

Entrenchment of Poverty and Inequality

Poverty and inequality has been further entrenched in these countries due to the neoliberal policies promoted by these organizations.96 Anghie argues that this is because such
structural adjustment programmes have undermined important economic and social
rights, and that some of these countries are actually worse off than before. This is because
priority has been given to debt repayment rather than provision of basic welfare, where
prices of basic commodities increase, public services are affected and unemployment
increases.97 Other elements like cutting public expenditure, labour market deregulation,
export-oriented production and privatization “have led to increased income disparity,
human rights abuses, and marginalization of the poor and rural populations in many
countries.”98

The increase in poverty can be evidenced by the fact that during the same time as
international financial institutions have proliferated, the world economy has grown
twenty times, while inequality has increased. Pahuja suggests that “in regional terms, the
ratio of per capita income of Europe to Africa in 1960 was 30:1. In 2005, it was 40:1.”99
As such, the policies may have been good for some actors, but not for the poor as claimed
by these institutions. Regardless of this, the World Bank argues that poverty has been
significantly reduced.
3.

Conflict and Collapse in State Institutions – the Example of Yugoslavia

As monetary intervention can have negative economic and social effects on many people
in the target countries, this has sometimes developed into further destabilization of the
society and the general security. Orford uses the example of the conflict in the former
Yugoslavia and explains that although foreign institutions were not solely responsible for
the genocide and conflict that played out in the early 1990s, they did have a decisive role.
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Orford adds that Yugoslavia was part of a strict austerity programme during the 1970s
and 1980s as a part of a debt restructuring by the IMF. The following economic policies,
which were carried out through decisions by IMF and economic liberals in the Yugoslav
government, were designed to refinance and repay Yugoslavia’s debt, which
consequently affected constitutional reforms and worker’s rights during the 1980s.100 By
the end of the 1990s, the war in the former Yugoslavia had displaced nearly 1,8 million
people.101

The structural adjustment programme in Yugoslavia involved similar elements as
mentioned above, among them cuts in government expenditures, removal of protections
against unemployment, liberalization of trade and prices, as well as promotion of exports
and centralized political and economic decision making. Political barriers to a market
economy were completely removed. Although presented as technical solutions, Orford
argues that they had political implications, and as such the IMF reshaped Yugoslav
politics throughout the following decades, through requiring constitutional and
institutional reform in order to give more loans.102
The new policies in Yugoslavia contributed to the genocide through creating conditions
for poverty, unemployment and destruction of important state functions that had kept the
various ethnic groups together, which in turn led to raising nationalism and eventually
threatened domestic peace. Orford shows that this was enabled through a number of
factors. Firstly, inflation, falling incomes, serious unemployment, loss of food subsidies
and rising prices on commodities like gasoline and food created a sense of instability, and
caused mass demonstrations. Secondly, the removal of constitutional arrangements and
minority rights guarantees, as well as centralization of decision making removed
mechanisms for accommodating ethno-national differences. The result was increased
nationalism and a widening gulf between rich and poor republics.103 Finally, people
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started to look elsewhere for a sense of community and identity, and that in this vacuum,
the ethnic nationalism re-emerged, where nationalist groups challenging the federal
government were able to appeal to those suffering from the reforms. In the end, the
political system started breaking down.104 As such, the genocide and the resulting
displacement was a combination of international financial policies and local responses.105
4.

Human Rights Abuses as People Resist Reforms

While global institutions and the governments that influence them have partly caused
destabilization and conflict in various countries, the consequences have in other situations
been less severe, but triggering human rights abuses. Susan Marks argues that
governments with a need to undertake major unpopular reforms, have few options other
than violently suppress the opposition that surges as a consequence. As such, global
institutions have played an important part in causing human rights abuses. She refers to
the examples of Argentina and Chile, where the international financial institutions
imposed major economic restructuring schemes in the 1970s, which deepened the poverty
of people and led to severe oppression and human rights abuses as the government
attempted to control discontent.106 Human rights abuses are one of the main causes of
displacement, which can also be observed in terms of the amounts of refugees fleeing
Chile and Argentina in the period following the restructuring.107

5.

How Such Policies are Made Possible

During the previous paragraphs it is clear that the actions of the WB and IMF are not
only assisting Third World states to repay their debt and create economic growth, but
they are rather creating conditions for instability, conflict and poverty, which in turn
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induce displacement. However, if these are the consequences, why is it so that these
institutions as well as the states controlling them are not held accountable? The
explanation is related to a number of factors.

Firstly, historical inequalities and power relations between states, lack of UN General
Assembly supervision over the IFIs108 as well as their internal structure give these
institutions the ability to enforce their vision onto the host states. Secondly, the
localization of causes for conflicts, poverty and displacement ensure that external causes
are hidden from view. Thirdly, the adoption of a narrative of human rights and good
governance by the IFIs enforces the idea that these institutions are assisting with
solutions while the local needs to change. I argue that such a narrative ensures that the
link between structural adjustment and displacement is nowhere to be found.
Third World states’ unequal opportunities in the international economic system can be
traced back to colonialism, where they have been unable to adequately gain a better
position after independence. Already disadvantaged by colonialism, after independence,
as Third World countries entered into a debt crisis in the 1980s, they had no other option
than resorting to assistance from the IFIs and accept their disadvantageous conditions.109
Such disadvantage has been enabled through the fact that the WB and IMF are creations
of Western states and are undemocratic.110 This is related to their particular voting
systems, which is weighted on the financial contributions by the members.111 The WB has
a similar decision-making system. Thus, developing countries, who constitute over 85%
of the world’s population, are severely under-represented, and the major industrial
powers hold the control.112

108

DAVID HULME, GLOBAL POVERTY: GLOBAL GOVERNANCE AND POOR PEOPLE IN THE POST-2015 ERA
103 (Second edition ed. 2015).
109
GILBERT RIST, THE HISTORY OF DEVELOPMENT: FROM WESTERN ORIGINS TO GLOBAL FAITH 172–173
(3 ed. 1997).
110
RAJAGOPAL BALAKRISHNAN, INTERNATIONAL LAW FROM BELOW: DEVELOPENT, SOCIAL MOVEMENTS
AND THIRD WORLD RESISTANCE 97–98 (2003).
111
About the IMF, supra note 90; Gerald K. Helleiner, Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the global
economy be civilized?, 2 J. HUM. DEV. 27–46, 36–37 (2001); ANGHIE, supra note 84 at 259.
112
Helleiner, supra note 111 at 33–34.

33

The initial disadvantageous economic position as well as the inability to affect the
decision making in these institutions, enables, according to Pogge, affluent states to
structure international economic laws and policies according to their benefit.113 This can
be shown by looking at how the present asymmetrical rules allow affluent countries to
have an increased share in the global economic growth.114 In addition, governments are in
turn strongly influenced by private corporations through their business lobbies. As such,
Helleiner claims that the bulk of the power in decision making in the global economy
rests “with those countries, firms and organizations that are economically (and, it must be
added, militarily) the strongest”, which is contradictory to the claim that both the weak
and the strong are equal participants in the political processes.115

Consequently, global economic governance will be biased in favour of the affluent
countries which control IFIs and use the power in their own interest, and it could be
questioned whether human development and the struggle against poverty will actually
receive any real focus.116 Any change in these institutions or the global order in general,
would likely require the affluent to give up some of their extensive privileges, and as
such any reforms are blocked by these governments as they are protecting and advancing
their own interests.117 In this context, it seems clear that European policies towards the
displaced are not just inadequate in the face of global inequalities that drive
displacement; but rather European migration and asylum policies may well be a
conscious part of ensuring that systemic European privilege stays in place and is
reinforced.
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With such inequalities in mind, the international financial institutions and the affluent
countries controlling them are able to justify their interventions through constructing a
narrative claiming that local problems are the reasons for the misery in the Third World
and unable to govern themselves, while the international community is offering
assistance to rectify this and avoid global economic crises.

According to Anghie and Pahuja, rather than considering external factors, the narrative
mostly localizes causes of poverty in the Third World, and points to poor political and
institutional culture with corrupt elites, oppressive governments, as well as with an
absence of formal laws and institutions, which in turn limits opportunities for investors.118
International historic and continuing reasons for underdevelopment are hidden from
sight, and consequently international causes are not addressed through international law
regimes but rather are reinforced.119 This can be noticed by the fact that the IMF and
particularly the WB, claim that they are furthering good governance, human rights and a
better global economic policy.120

Critics such as Pahuja, Anghie, and Rajagopal hold that international institutions are
including good governance and democracy in their programmes as a new way of
governing the Third World, although in reality this is only a pretext to deradicalize,
coopt, or channel into innocuous directions any Third World resistance to their policies
and “contain the rebellion from the bottom.”121 This narrative of bad governance,
corruption and human rights abuses as internal to the Third World state provides the
moral and intellectual foundation to manage the Third World and their peoples,122 where
they need dominance for their own good.123 The narrative allows IFIs to claim that they
are promoting international human rights law rather than violating it.124 As such, it has
proven difficult to assert human rights violations against rich states and international
118
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financial institutions.125 After going through periods of conditionality and structural
adjustment, the ongoing failure of developing or attaining growth and prosperity is still
blamed on a domestic failure to achieve good governance, not the interference of the
international community.126

D.

Conclusion

Considering the large displacement of people within and from the Third World, it is clear
from this chapter that not only local causes can be blamed, although these are the
frequent objects of national and international policy. It is important not to ignore local
factors such as corruption, human rights abuses, quests for power and inequality.
However, it is necessary to consider that the international community, including affluent
European states, through the international financial institutions that they control, are able
to intervene deeply into the political, economic and social structures of these Third World
states and instrument vast changes in this regard. This is carried out under the banner of
human rights, good governance and development, so desperately needed in these
countries.

However, history shows the disastrous results that such interventions can have for the
most vulnerable in these countries, and it becomes clear that the IFIs alleged principles of
human rights are rather a pretext in order to uphold the existing unequal global system,
where the gap between rich and poor countries is only widening. This triggers reflections
on the European policies on displacement and refugees mentioned in chapter three. If it is
true that international institutions, with their European and other wealthy states as
political drivers, are implicated in entrenching poverty and creating conditions for
conflict and human rights abuses in the Third World, European asylum policies are
neither sensible nor fair. With global inequality continuously growing, human rights
abuses and conflicts are likely to continue, with mass displacement as one of its potential
consequences. Migrants and asylum seekers will continue looking for a way across the
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Mediterranean due to broad and systemic economic injustice but such considerations are
rarely addressed, either in general international law scholarship or in refugee law
scholarship, which indicated that affluent states are unwilling to give up their privileges.
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V.

International Trade Law, Poverty and Population Movement

As has been mentioned in other chapters, while refugees flee due to human rights abuses,
instability and conflict, an important related factor for each of these issues is increasing
inequality and entrenched poverty. Indeed, the main reason for contemporary human
movement is seeking economic betterment. Thus, when considering international law’s
role in contributing to displacement it is necessary to consider factors that entrench
poverty. Since poverty is closely related to instability and human rights abuses, especially
in terms of spurring popular discontent and thus often violent state action, it is an
important factor in creating conditions for conflicts.

Many scholars are concerned about trade law contributing to poverty and inequality,
where they hold that although trade has the potential of creating growth and increasing
income, the current global trade regime is rather a system that upholds existing
inequalities and further entrenches poverty in the Third World, while benefitting
multinational companies. Scholars discussing other types of migration like for example
that of labour, also link trade with migration patterns.127

In this chapter I will discuss two main characteristics of international trade law, the
World Trade Organization (WTO) and its Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Other bilateral and regional agreements are held to
actually go further in terms of trade liberalization. However, the purpose of this thesis is
to take a snap-shot of how international structures of power are disadvantaging the Third
World, while creating benefits for other states and regions, which in turn has relevance
for understanding displacement and effective responses to it. Therefore, only the main
features of the world trade regime will be mentioned and I outline the most salient
consequences for poverty and migration. Finally, I clarify the main winners and losers
and explain how the winners continue entrenching poverty while claiming that the current
trade regime is beneficial for all.
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A.

Legal Overview of the World Trade Organization

The ostensible aim of trade liberalization, especially in context of the establishment of the
WTO, has been to maximize global economic welfare, which will be enabled through the
logic of comparative advantage and specialization in cost-efficient production.128 In
theory, the optimal use of the world’s resources will subsequently raise living standards
worldwide, in addition to greater employment, growth in incomes, as well as an
expansion in the production and trade in goods and services.129 The outcome would also
ensure peace, as trade would enhance realms of mutual interests and cooperation to
resolve problems.130 This narrative seems promising for those aiming to reduce and
manage displacement.

Greater developing country integration into the global economy is, according to the G7
countries, essential in order to achieve economic growth. This is said to require greater
market access to each others’ economies, requiring the requisite institutional reforms that
enable this. Liberalization of trade does not only mean lowering tariffs and non-tariff
barriers to trade – barriers that exist in developed and developing states - but there are a
number of other legal requirements. Among these we find “compliance with WTO
requirements on subsidies, intellectual property, customs procedures, sanitary standards
and policies vis-à-vis foreign investors”. These must be complemented by additional
reforms in order to ensure the right outcomes, and as such, states must also undertake tax
reforms in order to compensate for lost tariff revenues, social safety nets for displaced
workers, as well as labour market reform.131
An essential feature of the international trade regime is the TRIPS agreement, which is
administered by the WTO. These are rights that “relate to intangibles such as
information, knowledge, images or signs” where a negative right excludes others from
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producing an imitation.132 Protection occurs through legal concepts such as patents,
copyrights and trademarks, as well as plant variety protection, in addition to protecting
traditional knowledge as well as the data of pharmaceutical companies.133 As TRIPS is
under the WTO system, this ensures that there is an enforcement mechanism in place.134

B.

Aims of the Trade Regime

Trade liberalization and economic reforms undertaken in a number of regions and states
have enabled world trade to expand greatly during the last half century, where global
exports grew from just under USD 1 trillion a year in 1960, to about USD 10 trillion in
2008.135 A report by the International Organization for Migration (IOM) demonstrates
that foreign investment and trade creates more employment, and brings other benefits and
facilities, as globalization and trade connect consumers, workers and producers in new
ways.136 Rodrik argues that this type of growth also benefits the poor and points to
developing countries that have sustained rapid growth in the last decades and experienced
poverty reduction.137
Although TRIPS has been one of the most controversial elements of the WTO, as will be
further explained below, those advocating for it hold that intellectual property rights are
necessary in order to foster innovation. For instance, if pharmaceuticals do not get the
profit needed for developing costly drugs, there will be few incentives to do so.138

With such positive effects in mind, mainstream scholarship often considers poverty and
conflict as a local events with local origins, which can be relieved through enhanced
participation in international trade through the WTO. Pogge, for example, mentions
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Rawls, who blames the political, religious and philosophical traditions in such countries,
with their oppressive governments and elites. Poor governance is blamed for creating
poverty.139 The international trade regime is supposed to rectify such issues. The
following sections challenge this view, arguing that the way that the system is currently
organized, it can have negative effects on vulnerable populations, which produces rather
than prevents displacement. While local factors play a role in creating poverty, placing
emphasize on such factors alone gives an unbalanced picture of structural inequalities,
and consequently an incomplete view of migration dynamics.

C.

Consequences for Third World Countries

Although the international trade regime is held to enable overall prosperity, this has been
challenged by a number of scholars as well as civil society, where it is held that it rather
participates in restricting national sovereignty, entrenches poverty, and in general ignores
the way that currently developed countries were actually able to develop. As such,
according to Rodrik, various developing countries hold that there is an asymmetry in the
multilateral trade regime, where a few industrialized countries are dominating the agenda,
at the expense of the development concerns of most people.140

1.

Lack of Sovereignty

One of the consequences of participating in the global trade regime is that state
sovereignty and decision-making is circumscribed. Chimni and Rodrik hold that in order
to participate in the international trade regime and thus be allowed market access in the
North, Third World states are today relinquishing their sovereign economic, social and
political space to international institutions without having the opportunity to effectively
participate in the negotiations and decision-making that lead to the adoption of relevant
treaties.141 In this regards, states are required to adopt uniform global standards in crucial
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areas “such as agriculture, intellectual property rights (IPR), and regulation of foreign
investment and services”.

While following the global trade regime, states are unable to formulate or regulate their
own economic policy that could meet local needs and concerns, and undertake necessary
reforms that would enable the state to actually benefit from global integration.142 Rodrik
argues that this “overlooks the important functions that the state must play during the
process of economic transformation”. In addition, he claims that a more flexible approach
will benefit all parties.143 However as I explain further below, this perception may be
challenged as the advanced industrial countries are currently benefiting from the present
trade regime on expense of the developing countries, and as such, enhanced autonomy for
Third World states must necessarily reduce such benefits.

Although the erosion of sovereignty counts for all states, it does not have such negative
effects for developed states as they have the power to shape the policies of international
institutions, while the Third World does not.144 This is especially due to intense lobbying
by specific interest groups in the US and Europe, especially multinational corporations.
Thus, Rodrik and Drahos argue that many of the outcomes of the negotiations are a result
of this process, and that this works to the detriment of development goals.145 Third World
countries were side-lined in the WTO talks in Seattle in 1999 as well as towards the
adoption of the Doha Ministerial Declaration, where Third World opposition was
silenced by the Northern states, according to Chimni.146

In this way, in addition to the fact that competitive concerns in the industrialized world
also favour the policies fronted by their multinationals, groups of affluent states are able
to have their interests translated into international law.147 Although it is held that
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developing countries participate in the decision making process,148 I argue that most
people in developing countries lose, considering the high bargaining power that the
industrialized countries have. This is because although high-income countries constitute
only 15.7% of the world’s population, they have 79% of the world’s income. In this way,
they can afford taking a high price for access to their markets, and can thus have the last
say in the design of this order149

This initial inequality places into question the claim that poor countries have consented to
WTO membership, which is in theory voluntary.150 Pogge and Rodrik explain that there is
no real alternative, as those who do not join the WTO regime face even worse terms, as
bilateral and regional trade agreement often have worse terms for market access.151 The
failure of recognizing the underlying power structures that intimately shape bargaining
power enables the illusion of consent. As mentioned in chapter four, when national
decision making is eroding, states are vulnerable to the imposition of policies which,
rather than benefitting the population, are in the interest of outsiders. This has led to
political and social instability, which in turn affects displacement.
2.

Poverty and Lack of Growth

The most important argument against the functioning of the present trade regime, and the
most valuable for discussing factors of displacement, is that the current system actually
works to the disadvantage of developing states, while simultaneously benefiting the
already affluent. This is because the globalization of production is mostly carried out by
transnational corporations, which are hosted mostly by the EU, Japan and the US,
although there is an increase in firms from developing economies, albeit with less global
outreach and presence.152 Those who have benefited the most from globalization and
trade liberalization are investors, managers, and workers with internationally recognized
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and sought after education, while workers in sectors that were previously protected by
trade barriers and smaller enterprisers are the losers.153
In addition, the world’s wealthy countries spend over 300 billion USD a year in
agricultural subsidies, which thus depresses world prices for agricultural commodities,
which makes it difficult for small farmers to stay on the land.154 It would not be unlikely
that these people see the need to migrate to cities and take up employment there, which
would put pressure on employment in urban areas, prompting some to look for
employment outside of their country. Finally, Pogge suggests that developing countries
are competing in a race to the bottom in order to attract foreign investment, which leads
to human rights abuses where workers are exploited. This is especially due to the lack of
a minimum wage and global constraints on working hours through the WTO.155

The reason why TRIPS are so controversial is that they undermine a number of essential
rights by ensuring increased costs of the imitation on design on products. Pogge claims
that the current rules ensure that poor countries have to pay enormous sums to richcountry corporations in order to use their intellectual property.156 Consequently, this
affects for example the right to health, as the patent provisions result in increased
healthcare costs, which few developing countries can afford. This is because they must
drive up prices of pharmaceuticals in order to collect rents for the corporations whose
property rights must be respected. Simultaneously, pharmaceutical companies harvest
high profits. As such, one-third of the world’s population lack access to essential
medicines, and curable and preventable diseases are not treated. Intellectual property
rights are not initially a problem, but the way that they are currently instituted they
benefit corporations, Third World elites as well as people in the developed countries,
rather than Third World people.157 Drahos argues that IPRs matter more to long-term
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growth than other variables,158 and therefore, it has high implications for the possibility to
combat poverty and to ensure that people do not need to migrate in search for better
opportunities. High unemployment and poverty is a factor in creation of instability, as
was seen in the case of Yugoslavia in chapter four.

D.

Contradicting Claims

It could be expected that a reasonable counterargument is that protectionism has a
negative effect on world trade and prosperity in general, and that the reason why these
countries are struggling with poverty and unemployment has to do with local factors like
bad governance and local inequalities, as mentioned above. There may be something true
in this allegation, however, it is also interesting to notice that the developed countries
actually themselves used protectionism as a strategy in order to create economic growth,
and lowered them only after reaching an advanced stage of economic development. So
did many developing countries that ‘emerged’, like China, Brazil, and India. The Asian
Tigers, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand, were also allowed by the
US, eager to have a counterweight to the Soviet Union in the region, to have free access
to US markets while protecting their own.159 In contrast, Rodrik uses the examples of
Haiti, which through following all WTO prescriptions, has not achieved anything in
terms of poverty reduction.160

Currently, developing countries are denied the same strategies, with the claim that this is
harmful for world trade. Rodrik claims that this “raises serious questions about the
priority placed on integrationist policies in orthodox reform programmes”.161 This also
reinforces Chimni’s view that strong patent rights cannot be the “only way to encourage
invention and innovation”, and that enough profit to encourage this does not have to harm
the public interest.162
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Not only have countries developed through such measures, both Pogge and Chimni
demonstrate that industrialized countries are still allowing protectionist measures for
themselves.163 Thus, Pogge argues that affluent countries are allowed to “continue
protecting their markets…in ways that poor countries are not permitted, or cannot afford,
to match.”164 The consequences is that the affluent countries are receiving an unfair share
of the global economic growth, where he estimates that developing countries lose 700
billion USD annually in export opportunities due to such protectionism.165 Chimni claims
that even in the Doha sessions, which were called the development round, “the
industrialized world [was] insisting on further tariff concessions from the Third World
countries” while refusing to reduce its own subsidies in agriculture and textiles.166 Indeed,
the lack of progress in Doha led to an effective stalemate for progress of the WTO since
then, leading to a proliferation of bilateral and regional trade agreements instead.

Thus, it becomes clear that the present global institutional order is privileging the affluent
countries, although other alternatives are available. World trade laws help to create
poverty and inequality instead of combating it.167

E.

Privileging Third World Elites

The international trade regime through the WTO is not the only way that suffering is
institutionalized from an international angle. Rich states put in place, maintain through
financial and/or military support, and confer legitimacy to corrupt or unrepresentative
Third World leaders that are likely to do their bidding through allowing them to sell the
countries’ resources, take up loans on behalf of the country, as well as engaging in
treaties. When such privileges are conferred the political elites, their actions have
disastrous effects in countries which are poor but rich in resources,168 and also gives
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incentives towards “violent acquisition and exercise of political power”. This places the
responsibility of international actors in concluding treaties and financial transactions with
undemocratic or corrupt leaders into question.

Corruption has in addition been enabled through bribery of foreign officials, which
although still occurring, was in OECD countries until 1999 legal business transactions
where taxes could be deducted. This diverts loyalty from officials in these countries,
where public contracts are awarded to foreign companies at the expense of the needs of
the poor.169

F.

Conclusion

It cannot be denied that international free trade has benefits, innovations and knowledge
can be shared, and comparative advantages may create more efficient way of dividing
capital and goods. However, due to pervasive and increasing global inequalities, and thus
unequal bargaining powers, especially in the WTO but also in relation to bilateral and
regional trade and investment agreements, certain states and their corporations are able to
uphold a trade system that furthers their own interests on the expense of other, weaker
actors. Not only is the present system unjust, but the narrative about growth also furthers
the idea that all states can increase their income and prosper. This ignores the fact that the
system does not produce winners without also producing losers. The privileges of the
most affluent states were built on the misery of others, and the quest for free trade cannot
be at the expense of scrutinizing this enormous and increasing privilege and affluence. It
is unlikely that the affluent will give up their privileges voluntarily, which points to why
their wealth is systemically underplayed and sidelined by international laws that
ostensibly aim to reduce and eliminate poverty, war, human rights abuses, and
displacement.
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VI.
The Laws of War: Displacement, Military Intervention, and Post-Conflict
Statebuilding
It is not unusual for military interventions to exacerbate tensions and displacement as part
of their immediate effect. However, these negative consequences are justified as
inevitable immediate costs on the way to a longer term overall benefit. As will be
evidenced in this chapter, justifications range between halting mass atrocities and human
rights abuses being committed against a large part of the population, to ensuring
international peace and security through stabilizing the countries in questions, in addition
to halting the flows of refugees moving into neighbouring states. Furthermore, military
interventions have other consequences and aims not related to the intervention itself,
which is worthy of attention and critique: the consequent administration of the state
intervened in, where the international community and institutions take the lead in deep
intervention that transforms the concerned states from within.

As will be argued in this chapter, both military intervention as well as the post-conflict
statebuilding can sometimes have disastrous and destabilizing effects on these states and
peoples, which in the long term risks further displacement. I furthermore argue that the
states involved in both direct military intervention as well as the post-conflict
statebuilding are obfuscating their role in creating displacement, through the narrative of
peace, security and human rights.

I start with a basic introduction to when the use of military force is permitted under
international law. I then outline the direct effects of military interventions, as well as how
intervening states justify infringing on the sovereignty of other states and people.
Moreover, I attempt to discuss negative consequences of the post-conflict statebuilding
process. In this section, I hold that this also affects the sovereignty of the state in
question, as the rebuilding is often made on the intervener’s premises and thus tailored
according to their interests, rather than the subject state’s needs. This is significant to the
issue of displacement because, as has been seen in chapter four and five, such policies
often lead to poverty, destabilization and conflict.

A.

Legal Overview

Military intervention, the use of force, is “one of the most controversial areas of
international law,” and is sanctioned by the UN Charter Chapter VII. 170 The use of force
is prohibited by Article 2(4) of the UN Charter, and its main exceptions are a state’s right
to self-defence under Article 51, and the use of force authorized by the Security Council
under Chapter VII.171

Humanitarian intervention and the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine claim to
protect civilians and end gross human rights violations in the target state. It is
controversial whether humanitarian intervention is legal, however a number of states
have used these doctrines while carrying out military interventions, among them the
NATO action over Kosovo in 1999 and the intervention in Libya in 2011.172

The International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) formulated
the concept of the R2P doctrine in its report in 2001, which was endorsed by the UN
General Assembly 2005.173 This doctrine has three elements; the responsibility to
prevent, react and rebuild. It is more than just military intervention, as it extends to a
wider framework of obligations, preventing conflict through political, diplomatic, legal,
economic and security means. The rationale is that the international community should
address root causes and direct causes of conflicts where prevention as the most important
dimension should always be exhausted before any intervention is considered through the
Security Council, including providing assistance for post-conflict reconstruction.174 This
controversial doctrine serves as an important illustration to my argument because, as will
be explained below, its putatively noble intent can camouflage negative consequences for
170
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Third World people, and demonstrates how states and international institutions can
obfuscate their responsibility for institutionalizing suffering and exploitation of the Third
World, thus ensuring that there is no need to take responsibility for the consequent
displacement.

B.

Immediate Effects of Intervention

This chapter examines the long-term effects of intervention. Military intervention,
whether classified as humanitarian or not, can lead to displacement, even when it has as
its core purpose stemming displacement by stopping atrocities that are causing mass
movement. As an example, Afghanistan, Iraq, Kosovo, and Libya have all faced external
intervention, with major consequences for displacement. Although Syria may not be
subject to intervention sanctioned by international law, all the big powers are intervening
there through provision of arms, money and military training.175 These continue being
countries or origin or transit for a number of refugees reaching Europe today.

Although the NATO bombing in Kosovo was intended to halt the civil war occurring, it
is estimated that between 400,000 to 500,000 people were displaced between the start of
the campaign until the Yugoslav forces withdrew 3 months later.176 Another example is
Afghanistan, which has suffered a number of interventions and civil conflicts since the
Soviet invasion in 1979, and the most recent intervention led by the US in 2001
compounded the existing refugee crisis, where hundreds of thousands of civilians were
displaced.177 In Iraq, nearly 200,000 people were displaced following the intervention led
by the US and the UK in 2003.178 As will be mentioned below, this intervention led
ultimately to one of the largest refugee crises in the world 2007,179 a crisis which has still
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not receded.180 Although claimed to have been successful by many and having averted a
bloodbath, others hold that the NATO intervention in Libya in 2011, following a Security
Council resolution, created the conditions for the start of the civil war,181 prompting over
a million people from 120 nationalities residing in the country to seek refugee outside of
the country.182 Syria is currently the largest refugee population under UNHCR’s mandate,
with 4 million hosted by neighbouring countries, and 7.6 million IDPs.183

C.

International Law Justification for Military Intervention

Military interventions are justified by pro-interventionists in a number of ways, including
saving people from gross human rights abuses like genocide due to alleged Third World
backwardness, the pursuit of world security, as well as shoring up refugee flows before
they reach Europe, or other developed countries. In such situations it is usually held that
there were no other options, and that the international community could not stand by and
watch thousands of people suffer. In this way, displacement is seen as an unfortunate, but
necessary, consequence, in the pursuit of a higher aim for peace. According to the same
narrative, such displacement would not have occurred if the local government had
behaved responsibly in the first place. However, as will be shown in this chapter, despite
ostensibly noble reasoning, interventions are very costly and are rarely carried out
without particular interests for the interveners in mind. As such, the way that the states
are administered in the time following the military intervention may cause as much harm
as the intervention is claiming to prevent.
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1.
Saving People from Human Rights Abuses, World Security, and Third
World Backwardness
One of the main justifications for military interventions in other states is that gross human
suffering is taking place. Ethnic tension, civil war, religious turmoil, flows of arms,
economic inequalities, population pressures, ecological disasters are used by the
interveners as a pretext and for military intervention.184 The call to save Third World
people from mass atrocities is fuelled by the narrative of the powerless Third World
people, victims of their uncivilized leaders, where the international community, that is,
the West, is their saviour. Orford analyses that people and states are portrayed as
primitive and barbaric, unable to govern themselves, and as such the Third World
becomes a problem needing to be solved through international intervention.185

Intervention is further justified through redefining the concept of state sovereignty, which
places the prime responsibility to protect citizens at the hands of the state. While
intervention violates international law and undermines the UN charter, the lack of
intervention in the event of mass atrocities is considered by many to be just as grave
ethically. Chandler suggests that the R2P doctrine attempts to solve this dilemma by
redefining sovereignty in terms of a state’s responsibility to protect its people from
human rights abuse rather than political autonomy. In that way, it would according to this
doctrine be justified to intervene in the event of mass atrocities, as the sovereign state did
not fulfil its responsibility to protect its citizens required by the redefined concept of
sovereignty.186

The Third World is portrayed in security texts as a major threat to international security,
which must be acted against in order to secure world peace and stability. This is
especially because intra-state conflict and state collapse is portrayed as the most pressing
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problem of global security.187 According to Orford, the pro-interventionist narrative
argues that the failure to act against such issues would be seen to betray the main purpose
of the established international order.188 As such, the images of the chaotic Third World
incapable of governing itself makes coercive intervention considered to be desirable
mean to contain the crisis of disorder and fragmentation, thus upholding an efficient
world order.189 As this is considered a mostly local problem, statebuilding is seen as an
appropriate solution.190

The narrative of saving Third World people and the quest for international security is
ultimately based on the notion that the international community is the guarantor of values
like peace, freedom, justice and human rights, which must be upheld at all costs in order
to rescue the oppressed. In this way, according to Orford, the need for human rights and
democracy thus gives an alibi for enhanced international presence in many countries,
including military actions like aerial bombardment.191 This heroic narrative ignores the
international community’s domination and exploitation of the Third World through
military and economic intervention, which is part of the reason for the emergence of
security and humanitarian crises.192 In that way, these actions’ role in creating conditions
for more displacement is hidden from sight, as any resulting displacement is an
unfortunate consequence in order to reach the noble cause.

2.

Shoring up Refugee Flows

Finally and most importantly, intervention is often legitimized through its call to stop
refugee flows and as a humanitarian call to assist those displaced by Third World state
violence. I argue that such actions are rather a pretext to ensure that refugees do not reach
developed countries, and are not aimed at improving the lives of refugees as such.
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According to Roberts, refugee communities are sometimes seen as a threat to
international peace and security themselves. He argues that international military action
as well as other assistance by international organizations have prevented or reversed
refugee flows,193 despite the opposite also occurring.194 He claims that a number of
Security Council resolutions in the 1990s legitimated similar threats as grounds for
intervention.195

Orford criticizes this use of humanitarian intervention as it rather aims to prevent the
exodus of refugees, not to end their suffering, as refugees inspire fear as much as
compassion. Thus, the intervention is carried out in order to uphold the separation of the
developed world and suffering masses, which in Orford’s words serves to “distance the
colonized from the colonizer”.196 As such, humanitarian intervention responds to crises
that have brought the Other, the refugee, too close, in order to ensure that they are unable
to seek asylum,197 particularly in the North. In this way, it could be assumed that
interventions and policy choices during assistance are more tailored with the aim of
ensuring refugees do not leave, rather than emphasizing their well-being and needs.

As explained in chapter four and five, many developed states are, through economic and
trade law, responsible for creating conditions for conflict and displacement. Military
intervention in the pretext of shoring up refugees in the Third World thus becomes a way
to ensure that responsibility for this never has to be taken, as the refugee will not be able
to reach these states in order to apply for asylum. The irony is that military intervention
creates even more displacement both through the military action itself, as well as by
enabling the international community to impose economic and trade policies favourable
to the interveners through post-conflict statebuilding.

193

Adam Roberts, Refugees and Military Intervention, in REFUGEES IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 213–
234, 231–232 (Alexander Betts & Gil Loescher eds., 2011) In addition, Roberts confirms that two of the
largest refugee returns in the past half century were enabled due to military intervention, the independence
of Bangladesh and refugees returning to Afghanistan after the 2001 war, although these were not always
voluntary and that people returned to dire conditions and continued displacement. At 218.
194
Id. at 213.
195
Id. at 214.
196
ORFORD, supra note 105 at 125.
197
Id. at 124, 211.

54

D.

The Aftermath of the Intervention: Rebuilding of the State

The international community is also creating displacement through post-conflict
statebuilding, as it enables the intervening states to continue exercising control over the
state in question, through rebuilding the state according to their own interests, often at the
expense of the interests of the state and the people. Thus, actual military intervention is a
small but essential part of the international community’s involvement in the states
concerned, as it is the means by which other types of interventions occur. While some of
the ensuing activities may create positive effects in intervened countries, I argue that
many also serve the interest of hegemonic powers and institutions, which has as its
consequence the destabilization and continuous dependency of these states. Thus, postconflict statebuilding in many ways serves to undermine the very values that it allegedly
promotes, and the result is continuous trends of displacement, while the intervening states
can hide behind the claims of technical and financial assistance.

1.

Loss of Sovereignty while Retaining Responsibility

Through statebuilding, the intervening powers are able to increase international influence
deep into the economic, legal and political structures of Third World states. Such
interventions are made possible as the international community is seen as a civilizing
administrator, where Third World peoples are assumed not to know what is best for them
or how democracy works. The international community, including international
institutions, gain power over internal governance mechanisms in these states, which
replaces the need for external pressure.198 Through the R2P doctrine’s redefinition of state
responsibility, the intervening states and institutions shift the responsibility of any
potential failures and shortcomings onto the Third World state.199 This new focus on the
state ensures that the interveners have less responsibility, while still being able to
intervene and rebuild the state on behalf of the locals.200 The relationship becomes
198
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coercive through a fictitious partnership, forcing the non-Western state to cede its
sovereign powers,201 although it superficially looks like a voluntary form of
imperialism.202

As such, post-intervention reconstruction has the capacity to entrench an unjust
international economic order and neo-colonial forms of governance.203 Orford explains
how the UN and the World Bank acted as a trustee while taking over the administration
in East Timor in the transition to independence, which created conditions for a limited
sovereignty similar to the Mandate System under the League of Nations, which was a
new colonialism based on economic control.204

In Afghanistan we find a similar narrative, where Afghan representatives set out the plan
for governance in Bonn under the auspices of the UN, while the World Bank, the United
Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and the Asian Development Bank decided on
how to transform Afghanistan into a market economy.205 Orford thinks that the role
played by the international community in such situations is at odds with actual selfdetermination, even if this is the claimed purpose.206

As explained in chapter four, the lack of sovereignty forces the state to accept policies
and legislation that favour international institutions, states and corporations rather than to
the benefit of the people of concern, which has led to poverty, destabilization and human
rights abuses, as explained in the case of Yugoslavia.
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2.

Markets, Trade and Economic Policies

Through various components of statebuilding, intervention by the international
community serves to change trade and economic policies which open up markets to
foreign investors. Although this can have positive effects for the states involved, with
enhanced integration into the global economy, I argue that as this is carried out by
international actors, it is highly unlikely that it is done while disregarding these actors’
own interests. This is confirmed by Orford, holding that since“[p]ost-conflict
reconstruction [is] carried out under the auspices of international financial institutions”
this rather enables continued exploitation, as their concern is to “create a secure
environment in which foreign investment can produce profits for the shareholders of
multinational and foreign corporations.”207 She explains how critics argued during the
reconstruction of East Timor that it, under UN and WB management, was a paradise for
market driven foreign investors.208 The policies of international financial institutions and
trade law, and their effect on displacement have been explained in chapter four and five
respectively.

Nevertheless, international institutions that have been involved in creating displacement
continue to have a prominent role in post-conflict reconstruction. Evans, co-chair of the
ICISS, asserts that international financial institutions like the IMF should have a central
role in economic development and currency stabilization,209 which I argue ignores the
fact that, as explained in chapter four, IMF reforms have contributed to conflict and
displacement rather than to peace. If the international administration that is imposed
through the concepts of military intervention and the consequent rebuilding of the state
aims to facilitate such reforms, it can hardly be argued that it serves to protect people or
to prevent new conflicts from erupting. Orford claims that this is partly because the
international legal literature that celebrates achievements of post-intervention
reconstruction fails to criticize the economic order that is imposed through this process.210
207
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Solutions proposed by the international community that have actually contributed to
destabilization and conflict previously are rarely discussed, and as such, the power
relations between the Third World and the West is made obscure, where the hero of the
story is the intervener, usually the UN Security Council, NATO, or a US-led coalition.211
I argue that the narrative of peace and assistance removes from view the role that
powerful states have in creating displacement, thus making it look like only the local
governments are at fault. This enables these states to continue intervening, rather than
changing the international system of domination or offering asylum.

3.

The Example of Iraq

As an example of international intervention and administration leading to conflict rather
than mitigating it, is the US/UK intervention in Iraq in 2003 and the following work
towards rebuilding the state. The displacement of the Iraqis has been one of the largest
displacement crises during the last half century, and has resulted in profound and
irreversible changes in the Iraqi society and politics.

During the preparations for the US-led invasion, it was assumed that large displacement
of the Iraqi people would follow. However, this did not materialize, and only around
190,000 Iraqis were displaced between 2003 and 2005, leading to aid workers packing up
and leaving for more important crises.212 Nevertheless, after a few years of occupation
and failed American efforts to rebuild the country, a sectarian civil war broke out in
2006. Displacement increased greatly, 213 reaching around 2.4 million IDPs in Iraq by the
end of 2007,214 and around 1.7 to 2.3 million took refuge in neighbouring countries by the

211

Id. at 158–159.
See FAILED RESPONSIBILITY: IRAQI REFUGEES IN SYRIA, JORDAN AND LEBANON, 1–47 i, 1 (2008); Sarah
Kenyon Lischer, security and displacement.pdf, 33 INT’L. SEC. 95–119, 95 (2008); Ali Ali, Displacement
and statecraft in Iraq: Recent trends, older roots, 5 INT’L. J. CONTEMP. IRAQI STUD. 231–245, 232–233
(2011); FERRIS, supra note 178 at 9.
213
FAILED RESPONSIBILITY: IRAQI REFUGEES IN SYRIA, JORDAN AND LEBANON, supra note 212 at i,1;
FERRIS, supra note 178 at 9.
214
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION FOR MIGRATION, IRAQ DISPLACEMENT 2007 YEAR IN REVIEW 1–7
(2007),
https://www.iom.int/jahia/webdav/shared/shared/mainsite/media/docs/reports/2007_year_in_review.pdf.
212

58

end of 2008.215 The Iraqi refugee crisis was considered the world’s second in terms of
numbers in 2008.216

Given that the displacement was mainly carried out by local militia groups and was due
to the civil war where the society started fragmenting along ethnic and sectarian lines,217
this displacement may seem nothing more than locally induced, although the invasion a
few years earlier could merely have triggered already underlying ethnic tension and
quests for power.218 However, others hold that it was due to the statebuilding processes
initiated by the US-led Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA), which dismantled and
rebuilt the state from the bottom. The US led administration was able to dismantle the
nationalist cohesion in Iraq in a number of ways, among them the process of deBa’athification,219 dismantling of the military, encouraging a state set-up along ethnical
and sectarian lines, as well as contributing to security gaps and economic hardships
which led people to seek protection by militias.220 As has been seen, the result was
disastrous with millions displaced and unable to return to their homes.

E.

Conclusion

Military intervention does not only lead to displacement in the immediate aftermath, but
the work towards rebuilding the state according to the interveners’ preferences and favour
also plays an important role in triggering displacement in the long run. Through calls for
respect for human rights and international security, while claiming that the Third World
peoples with their brutal regimes are incapable of independent government, the West,
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including European countries, engage in deep structural and administrative changes in the
concerned states. This is often claimed to be on behalf of the Third World people
themselves, which are in need of rescue. Under such a narrative, it seems reasonable that
intervention is necessary as well as welcomed by local populations. The international
community claims that they are equipping the new state with tools that will enable selfgovernment.

However, external players are making key administrative decisions for these states,
creating an uneasy relationship between international administration on one side, and
self-determination on the other. While the decisions made are often aimed at entering the
new state into a global economy, this is carried out to the benefit of the interveners and
international institutions they control. As a consequence, real democracy and decision
making is not present, while simultaneously a number of the decisions taken entrench
existing inequalities, which further leads to destabilization of the state and society.
Accordingly, the international community is itself part of creating the conditions for
conflict and displacement, despite this being the initial claimed reason for intervention.
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VII.

Climate Change Induced Displacement

One of the main factors for contemporary and future displacement is climate change and
environmental degradation. Rising sea levels, change in local weather conditions causing
drought and cyclones, as well as deforestation, desertification, in addition to loss in
livelihoods and agricultural production and lack of food security, prompt people to
migrate in order to improve their livelihoods, or even to save their lives.

Although migration and displacement is affected by a number of factors, climate change
can make people leave their homes both as a direct or an indirect reason. This is because
climate change may result in increased tensions and conflict over scarce resources, and as
such, indirectly result in displacement.

I argue that international laws on the environment and on population movement do not
clearly make a link between those who cause environmentally-induced displacement and
the responsibility they should take for it. As such, the current international laws on
migration and the environment allow rich states to escape the issue of responsibility for
displacement, even though the most affluent states are responsible for most of the CO2
emissions. It is for example unclear whether, under international law, states responsible
for climate change should reduce emissions, or provide asylum, fund adaption measures,
or provide compensation, or do a combination of these things, in order to alleviate
displacement.

This chapter will outline the main international laws that address climate change and
displacement, showing that the link between the two types of laws is non-existent, and
that consequently most solutions are geared towards local adaption measures. Next, I
explain how climate change directly and indirectly causes displacement through reducing
livelihoods and spurring conflict. Thereafter, the main CO2 emitting states will be
identified, as well as the main reasons for climate change. Finally, I look at how cuts in
emissions are discouraged due to the continuous demand for growth, and consider how
this, in addition to the lack of other mitigation measures for refugees, leaves refugees in a

limbo with no responsibility taken for them, whether asylum, cut in emissions, or types of
local assistance and adaptation.

A.

Legal Overview

1.

International Environmental Law

International Environmental Law (IEL) deals with a range of issues that are important
causes of displacement, including climate change, deforestation, desertification,
biodiversity loss, water scarcity, pollution and hazardous wastes. Many of the
environmental agreements aim for sustainable resource use, as well as constraints on the
commercial exploitation of scarce resources, through the overarching principle of
sustainable development. However, progress in such agreements has been limited.221
Natarajan and Khoday hold that this is affecting the poor the most, as “access to clean air,
water, food, and sustainable livelihoods becomes more precarious.”222

Although IEL deals with a number of issues affecting displacement, it does not deal with
the issue directly. The UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC)
provides, however, that parties assist economically developing states vulnerable to
adverse effects of climate change. This provision is recalled in the Kyoto Protocol but it
is not clear how this is supposed to be carried out.223 Mayer also demonstrates that
regional and bilateral negotiations removes the burden of climate change induced
migration from the historical responsibility for climate change, as it seems like countries
would prefer to pay their way out of it and rather attempt to solve the problem inside of
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developing countries rather than offering relocation programmes.224 Finally, attempts to
introduce displacement into the agenda for climate talks in Paris were rejected and thus
displacement is not mentioned in the Paris Convention, which shows the refusal in taking
such responsibility.225

The lack of clear responsibility from developed states is in contradiction to the principle
of common but differentiated responsibility for the global environment, an important
principle of equity in IEL. The principle is mentioned both in the Rio Declaration and the
Kyoto Protocol, and is a “manifestation of general principles of equity in international
law.”226 This concept attempts to set up flexible mechanisms acknowledging the fact that
the most serious climate change and environmental impacts are affecting developing
states, which have the least historical responsibility for causing it, in addition to having
less economic and technical capacity to tackle such problems. Therefore, this principle
stipulates that states that cause environmental harm, and those states that have better
economic and technological capacity, should bear a greater burden as well as take the
lead for solutions.227

2.

International Refugee Law and Migration in International Law

International refugee law and other international laws governing the movement of people
do not address environmentally induced migration, and as such the issue of climate
change is left up to IEL. Natural disasters are not a part of the 1951 Refugee Convention,
which does not mention environmental change at all. People displaced by environmental
reasons can only be recognized as refugees if they can demonstrate that after a drought,
224
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famine or other environmental disasters they will have a well-founded fear of being
persecuted because of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group,
or political opinion.228 Otherwise, if they cross an international border, they are left to the
host state’s domestic migration law. As such, they are usually considered economic
migrants which, as mentioned in chapter three, ensures that developed states have
minimal obligations towards them and wide discretion in how they are dealt with.
Therefore, in general, although people in some regions seek assistance abroad, most
people fleeing disasters remain in their own country,229 where they are under the mercy of
their own state.

Also, at the EU level, there is no distinct instrument for environmentally displaced
people, although according to the UNHCR, some EU member states are explicitly
considering environmentally displaced individuals.230 As an example, Finland and
Sweden have adopted domestic legal provisions granting subsidiary protection to anyone
who, “by reason of an environmental catastrophe, cannot return to his home country.”231

However, most solutions proposed relate to enhancing the resilience of the people most
vulnerable to climate change, which means assisting people in the Third World through
adaptation strategies.232 Developed have agreed to participate with 100 billion USD per
year by 2020 through the Paris Agreement, however, until now the Green Climate Fund
has raised 10.2 billion USD only,233 which indicate that the actual assistance is highly
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inadequate. In conclusion, it is clear that international law is poorly equipped to deal with
the challenge of people displaced by climate change.

B.

The Challenge of Climate Change

Climate change is becoming a main defining force of human development in the coming
century,234 as human activity is placing a strain on the functions of the earth that
ecosystems may not be able to sustain future generations.235 There is a limit to how much
carbon dioxide the earth can absorb without creating dangerous climate change effects,
which we are currently moving dangerously close to.236 Climate change is expected to
include more extreme weather, which is already happening. This will affect all
countries,237 and includes impacts on the ecology, changed weather systems and local
rainfall patterns, storms, floods, droughts, change in temperature, melting glaciers,
desertification and rising sea levels.238

In addition to climate change, excessive consumption levels lead to air pollution,
deforestation, soil erosion and hazardous waste.239 In this chapter I am focusing on
human-induced climate change, as the phenomenon is unprecedented in human history.
However, it is necessary to keep in mind that serious displacement effects also occur with
regard to other environmental problems governed by IEL regimes for desertification,
deforestation, species extinction.240
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One of the main consequences of climate change is its negative effect on food security,
which is crucial in migration decisions. Climate change affects water provisions,
agriculture and global fish stocks, and consequently the price of food. Saul argues that
“the price of staple foods has increased by 80% over the past three years” and 100 million
people pushed into poverty over the last two years.241 He asserts that “[c]limate change
will aggravate the underlying causes of water scarcity in Asia,”242 and that 10-20 per cent
of drylands are already degraded on a global level. Over 2 billion people in dry and semidry areas are vulnerable to loss of crucial resources like water supply, which is expected
to further intensify during climate change.243

Although the consequences of past consumption patterns are already materializing,
disastrous changes will occur in the next century if this development is not halted.244
Whereas climate change will affect all people and states and nobody will be immune to
the consequences, the wealthier will be able to mitigate many of the risks.245 Developing
states in general, and the poorest people in particular, are more vulnerable to climate
change, especially due to geographic vulnerability as well as less ability to adapt and
mitigate risk.246

C.

Displacement Dynamics with Relation to Climate Change

As the intensity and frequency of extreme weather will be increasing, climate change will
exacerbate current displacement trends.247 The report Global Estimates published by
Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) and Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre
(IDMC) demonstrates that after adjusting for population growth, the displacement
associated with disasters has increased by 60 percent from the 1970s. Thus, we can see a
steady upward trend in displacement. This is however not related to climate change
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alone, but also to increased urbanization and economic vulnerability.248 The Advisory
Group on Climate Change and Human Mobility suggests that around 175 million people
in developing countries have been displaced by disasters.249 There are a number of
estimations related to future displacement, and it is held that many of them are not taking
migration dynamics into account.250 Numbers of potential environmental migrants by
2050 vary between 50 million and 350 million, where the most cited estimate is 200
million.251
Migration and displacement depends on the type of environmental hazard in question.
The elements mentioned in the previous paragraphs like sea level rise, drought,
desertification and other environmental stressors can lead to migration both directly and
indirectly, and as such they are not always the main cause of migration, but affects the
process through other means, like through spurring armed conflicts over decreasing
resources. Other factors like floods and tornados create emergency situations where
people flee immediately to save their lives, hazards which are expected to increase due to
climate change.252 Rising sea levels is expected to become an important factor in future
displacement, where small island states and low-lying coastal areas will be particularly
affected and people will be forced to move abroad.253 The link between climate change
and displacement can thus sometimes be difficult to identify, especially in the slow-onset
events.254

As climate change results in resource scarcity, this may very well result in conflict, which
is one of the main drivers of displacement. With lower agricultural production, restricted
food supply and higher energy prices, resource scarcity often leads to violence when
there are no other way of securing essential needs.255 Saul argues that the World Bank
“estimates that 33 countries are at risk of political destabilization and internal conflict due
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to food price inflation.”256 Furthermore, structural weaknesses of states will be aggravated
by impacts of climate change, as many states like Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya and Ghana are
already engaged in conflicts over land and resources, where desertification has been one
of the reasons. These are countries where many refugees originate from. Thus, climate
change and environmental hazards intensify other underlying causes of conflict.257 In
such cases refugees may have a better chance of applying for asylum as the direct cause
is not climate change itself, that is, if they are able to cross an international border.

It is important to consider environmental factors together with other socio-economic
dynamics while looking at decisions to migrate, as well as the ability to adapt. Several
non-climate factors need to be taken into account, like social and economic exclusion,
demographic developments and institutional constraints as well as overpopulated
settlements, overuse of natural resources and deforestation. Poverty and insecurity is
often interrelated with environmental factors when people decide to move,258 and as such
availability to coping mechanisms, which the industrialized countries have, is crucial.259 It
is generally accepted that multiple and overlapping causes and motivations affect
migration flows, and that they do not have one single cause, and many reinforce each
other.260 Therefore, the decision to migrate in response to environmental change is
complex.261 Consequently, solutions for climate refugees will need to take all these
elements into account.

D.

Main Reasons for Climate Change and the Continuous Demand for Growth

Climate change is mainly happening due to an increasing overconsumption and
exploitation of the earth’s resources in order to maintain ever higher levels of
consumption, a pattern initiated by the industrial revolution. Burning of fossil fuels is
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responsible for around half of the CO2 emissions, and the three main activities that have
led to climate change are power generation, transport and deforestation. This places
enormous pressures on the earth’s ecological systems, on which humanity depends. It is
estimated that humanity now uses the resources of 1.3 earths, or a third more of earth’s
capacity than what is available.262

As will be explained to a further extent below, only a very small proportion of the
world’s population has created climate change. As an example, the Human Development
Report held in 2007 that the UK with a population of 60 million emits more than Egypt,
Nigeria, Pakistan and Vietnam together, which had a population of 472 million that year.

China is a major emitter of CO2, but when the emissions are calculated per capita, they
are just one fifth of the size of that of the United States.263

Overconsumption is related to the persistent demand for increasing growth, which is in
sharp contradiction to the need for cuts in CO2 emissions, both in developed and
developing countries. This ‘growth doctrine’ is an essential reason why IEL is unable to
find real solutions for climate change, and thus for mitigating displacement. UNDP
argues that economic growth is one of the most powerful driver of emission trends.264
Consumerism is promoted in order to have the economy going, thus as a development
strategy promoted by governments world-wide.265 Natarajan and Khoday argue that the
natural environment is “fundamental to economic development” where nature is
considered something to be controlled, extracted and a form of capital, and that our
control over nature is perceived as limitless. IEL, as well as international law in general,
continues to understand nature primarily as a source of wealth that we should control,
rather than an essential condition underlying our existence.266
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Areas of law other than IEL continue promoting activities which lead to emissions, and
thus form a large obstacle to attempts by IEL to encourage cuts in this regard. Natarajan
and Khoday hold that while IEL attempts to protect the environment, other interests and
areas of international law continue to promote consumption and resource extraction,
especially as the regulation of natural resources is kept out of IEL.

In its quest for achieving consensus, IEL looks for environmentally friendly options for
growth, while the problem is the logic of growth itself.267 This logic has led us to rely
primarily on trade and economy based solutions for reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
Stallworthy argues that these have limited effect, as they maintain the “fossil-centered
industrial model,” which would just relocate manufacturing and distribution processes
elsewhere.268 Through other areas of law, industries are subsidized, like the transportation
and energy sectors, where cheap oil and electricity enhance production and consumption.
Business lobbies and policy makers stimulate consumerism and lobby for legislation that
stimulates it as well.269 Thus, IEL fails to stop ecological harm, which is particularly
noted in the failures to reach any significant agreements in negotiations.270

Consequently, in the stalemate between continuous demand for growth and climate
change, refugees are left with the consequences while the states that not only are the
largest polluters, but also have the key to change,271 are reluctant to deal with this issue.
This can be noticed through the fact that cuts in emissions are not legally binding, but
voluntary under the Paris Agreement.272
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E.

States with the Largest Ecological Footprints

It is uncontroversial that the richest countries are the main consumers and CO2 emitters
and thus have the deepest carbon footprints. This does not mean that countries from the
developing world are not making a carbon footprint, however the main responsibility
rests with the developed world.

From 1840 to 2004, the highest accumulated emissions come from the United States with
just below 30%, followed by Russia (8%), China (8%), Germany (7%) and the United
Kingdom (4%). The following countries are Japan, France, India, Canada and Poland,
and as such, the rich countries dominate the cumulative emissions account. If we look at
the carbon footprint of the EU countries together, they are responsible for around 20%.273
As a contrast, most developing countries have significantly lower emissions. Assadourian
estimates that the world’s richest 500 million “are currently responsible for 50 percent of
the world’s carbon dioxide emissions, while the poorest 3 billion are responsible for just
6 percent.274
The discrepancies between developing and developed countries with regards to CO2
emissions, where the developed countries bear the main responsibility, contradicts the
fact that the world’s poor carry most of the burden from climate change.275 Taking into
account the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities, it is reasonable to
expect that European states take a greater responsibility of cutting emissions, while also
offering solutions for those who will nevertheless inevitably be displaced due to ongoing
climate events.

F.

Conclusion

Despite the richest countries having the deepest carbon footprints, legal responsibility for
climate refugees is non-existent. Although these states have the ability to generate
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change, international law ensures that there is no real cuts in emissions, especially with
the continuing demand for growth and production. This, coupled with no international
protection for climate change induced refugees, means that most contemporary solutions
relate to enhancing the resilience of the people most vulnerable to climate change, which
means assisting people in the Third World through mitigation and adaptation strategies.
This is indeed necessary. However, I argue that such solutions clearly point to the fact
that developed states are refusing to take appropriate responsibility for people displaced
by climate change, which is due to no link between climate change and displacement in
either IRL or IEL. Although calls for such a link have been made, they have been actively
ignored.
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VIII. Conclusion
This thesis argues that the European bias of IRL, coupled with closed European borders
and aid to third countries, ensures that refugees are contained in the Third World, out of
Europe’s responsibility. Most importantly, I argue that European states, like many other
developed countries, themselves take part in creating conditions for displacement in the
Third World, while simultaneously refusing to take responsibility for them. This is made
possible as the link between IRL and other legal regimes like trade, economic policies,
military intervention and environmental law is non-existent.
The consequences of making such a link is that Europe’s role in institutionalizing
suffering and exploitation in the Third World becomes evident. Europe, like other
powerful states, is through international law carefully creating a narrative where it
portrays the international community (i.e. affluent states) as the savior enforcing
necessary policies for the benefit of a Third World incapable of governing itself.
Although local factors also play an important role in creating displacement, and are in
fact often the direct cause, I hold that it is highly problematic that the international
community obfuscates any potential link between its own actions and displacement.
Thus, the international community avoids the responsibility for refugees, whether this is
through asylum, adequate compensation or any attempt to alter the global unequal
system.

The disconnection between causes and consequences of displacement ensures that
genuine solutions for displacement cannot be found, as they relate to the unequal power
structures within international law itself, where those in power are unwilling to let go of
their privileges. As such, human rights abuses, poverty, conflict, and climate change will
continue displacing people until such issues are solved at the root, which cannot happen
until states with the largest influence over international law acknowledge their
responsibility. Therefore, although softer border controls and more assistance would be
helpful, such solutions are far from adequately addressing the real problem. As a
consequence, current European and other countries’ policies on asylum are clearly

misplaced. It becomes clear that these policies are not aimed at solving the refugee issue,
but rather to ensure that the exploitation and suffering that is caused by the international
community is hidden from sight and physically located elsewhere. In such a situation,
large numbers of people in the Third World are left to suffer in less than adequate
conditions, while Europeans can continue buttressing their lives of incredible privilege.
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